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Product Liability for Design in Louisiana
William E. Crawford* and
Jesse D. McDonald**
Most product liability litigation reaching the courts centers around
the allegation of deficient design or inadequate warnings, or both. Suc-
cessfully attacking a product's design ordinarily is the most difficult
type of product liability case and is the most expensive for both the
plaintiff and the manufacturer. Unlike other kinds of product liability
cases, the design case impacts an entire product line. Hence, the man-
ufacturer is often willing to defend the design case without regard to
litigation costs. For the trial lawyer, both counsel for plaintiff and
counsel for defendant, the design case is the most complex and de-
manding.
The Louisiana Products Liability Act, enacted by the legislature
effective September 1, 1988,' as Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2800.51
through 59, establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufac-
turers for damages caused by their products. Section .54 of the Act
identifies the elements that the plaintiff must prove to establish a man-
ufacturer's product liability, and recognizes four types of product de-
ficiencies that may give rise to liability, one of which is a deficiency
in the product's design. Section .56 of the. Act provides the specific
elements that the plaintiff must prove to establish that a product's design
is "unreasonably dangerous in design." Section .59 provides three de-
fenses to design liability, which the manufacturer has the burden of
proving. Under these provisions, the elements a claimant must prove
for design liability are:
(1) claimant's damage was proximately caused by
(2) a characteristic of the product that:
(i) existed at time product left manufacturer's control
(ii) or results from alteration or modification that is rea-
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sonably anticipated, and
(iii) is unreasonably dangerous in its design (as defined in
Section .56)
(3) and that the damage arose from reasonably anticipated use
of the product.
Section .56 describes twin requirements for a product to be "unreason-
ably dangerous in design," both of which must have existed at the time
the product left the manufacturer's control. 2 These comprise a threshold
requirement and a balancing test requirement, which can be summarized
as follows:
The Threshold Requirement:
(i) there existed an alternative design
(ii) capable of preventing claimant's damage
The Balancing Test Requirement:
A risk/utility balancing test that provides that the risk must
outweigh the utility.
The risk side encompasses the following:
(i) the likelihood the product's design at the time of the
accident would cause claimant's damage, and
(ii) the gravity of that damage; but in determining the
"likelihood" element, all "adequate warnings must be taken
into account which the manufacturer has taken reasonable
steps to provide users and handlers."
The utility side encompasses the following:
(i) the utility of the product as designed at the time of
the accident
2. La. R.S. 9:2800.56 (Supp. 1989), titled "Unreasonably dangerous in design,"
provides that:
A product is unreasonably dangerous in design if, at the time the product
left its manufacturer's control:
(1) There existed an alternative design for the product that was capable of
preventing the claimant's damage; and
(2) The likelihood that the product's design would cause the claimant's damage
and the gravity of that damage outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of
adopting such alternative design and the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative
design on the utility of the product. An adequate warning about a product
shall be considered in evaluating the likelihood of damage when the manufacturer
has used reasonable care to provide the adequate warning to users and handlers
of the product.
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(ii) the adverse effect, if any, on utility by the alternative
design arising not only from changes in usefulness, but
also from lessened or added dangers arising from the al-
ternative design.
(iii) the burden on manufacturer of adopting such an al-
ternative design.
Absent from plaintiff's burden of proof are any issues relating to knowl-
edge available to the manufacturer or design feasibility. These issues
comprise elements of defenses under Section .59 for which the manu-
facturer has the burden of proof.
Design liability in Louisiana before the new Products Liability Act
was detailed by the supreme court in Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp.,' which provided the following three separate theories for design
liability: (1) unreasonably dangerous per se, which was a simple risk/
utility balancing test; (2) unreasonably dangerous because an alternative
product existed that would serve the same needs and desires with less
risk of harm; and (3) unreasonably dangerous because an alternative
design existed that was feasible with less harmful consequences. Under
Halphen, the manufacturer was presumed to have the knowledge of an
expert that keeps abreast of all scientific knowledge, discoveries, and
advances. In contrast, under the new Products Liability Act, only a
single theory of design liability is provided, which is not the same as
any of the three theories provided by the court in Halphen. While the
new Products Liability Act incorporates a risk/utility balancing test for
design liability, the test comes into play only after plaintiff has identified
an alternative design for the product that was in existence at the time
the product left the manufacturer's control which had the capability of
preventing plaintiff's harm. Further, under the new Act, the balancing
test involves a comparison of the characteristics of the product as
originally designed with the characteristics of the product as alternatively
designed.
THE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENT
As indicated, to meet the "threshold requirement," plaintiff must
prove that there existed an alternative design that was capable of pre-
venting claimant's damage. The following questions of interpretation of
these terms immediately arise:
(a) What is required to show that an alternative design "existed"
when the product left the manufacturer's control?
- Is it sufficient that the design was merely conceived by
some person? or
3. 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
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- In addition to being conceived, must it have been reduced
to written word description or drawing? and
- Must the design have been acted upon by some manu-
facturer, and actually constructed and marketed for use on
products of some kind?
(b) Is there any special meaning in the phrase "for the product"?
- Does this phrase mean that the alternative design must
not only be in "existence," but additionally:
- Must the usefulness or suitability of the design have
been associated with the product or similar products
in some way as being useful therefor? or
- Must the alternative design that "existed" have
actually been manufactured and used by a manufac-
turer on some kind of product? or
- Must it have been manufactured and in use on the
same type or class of product as that involved in the
accident?
(c) Is there any special meaning attached to the word "capable"
beyond its ordinary meaning?
The threshold requirement that an alternative design be in "existence"
does not appear to be a part of the design liability provisions of product
liability legislation in other states. It is also not contained in the design
liability provisions of the proposed Louisiana Products Liability Act
provided to the legislature in 1983 by the Louisiana State Law Institute,
nor in the Uniform Product Liability Act promulgated in 1977 by the
United States Department of Commerce. 4
At a minimum, the threshold requirement that an alternative design
existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's control appears
to mean that, at that time, the alternative design identified by plaintiff
must have been conceived in the mind of some person and must have
either been described in writing or laid out in drawing form. Otherwise,
the design has not taken shape and organization sufficient to rise to
the dignity of "design." This is consistent with an accepted definition
of design as: "A mental project or scheme in which means to an end
4. Both the proposed Products Liability Act prepared by the Louisiana State Law
Institute for the Legislature in 1983, La. H.R. 711, Reg. Sess. (1983), and the proposed
Uniform Products Liability Act of 1977, provided for a risk/utility balancing test as an
element of design liability and required that the plaintiff prove that an alternative design
for the product was feasible and that the effects of the alternative design be taken into
account in a risk/utility balancing test. However, neither of the proposed Acts required
that the alternative design actually be in existence at any point in time.
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are laid down." 5 To implement the legislative intent, courts may require
that an alternative design be commercially or industrially available, i.e.,
published in a text, journal, or patent application, or the subject of
lecture at an industry conference. This interpretation is consistent with
Section .59(A)(2) and (3), which contemplate that such an alternative
design be based on "reasonably available scientific and technological
knowledge." Reasonably interpreted, the threshold requirement does not
demand that the alternative design already be incorporated into the
product or on the same kind of product made by other manufacturers.
Such an interpretation would render meaningless the "feasibility defense"
of Section .59(A)(3).
Interpretation of the phrase "for the product" as requiring that the
usefulness or suitability of the design has been at least in some way
associated with the product would also be inconsistent with the "feas-
ibility defense" of Section .59(A)(3). Such an interpretation would also
make "industry custom and usage" the standard selected by the Act,
which our prior Louisiana jurisprudence never recognized as setting any
"standard," but was at best simply deemed to be "some evidence" of
the reasonableness of a product's design.6 For the same reasons, the
"existing" alternative design need not have actually been manufactured
and used on a product, especially not on the same type or class of
product as that involved in the accident. No special meaning for the
phrase "for the product" appears to be discernable.
It must be noted that the word "capable" refers to the relationship
of the alternative design to the product that caused the injury. It must
be shown, therefore, that if the product had incorporated the alternative
design, its operative effect could allow plaintiff's accident and damage
not to occur. Use of the word "capable," therefore, expands the meaning
of the alternative design doctrine to include the requirement that the
alternative design must adapt to physical application to the product.
That is, the alternative design must be adaptable for physical incor-
poration into the original design and must have the operative effect of
allowing the accident which injured plaintiff not to happen.
THE BALANCING TEST REQUIREMENT
To meet the balancing test requirement, the plaintiff must prove
that the risk side must outweigh the utility side, in association with a
comparison of the product as originally designed, with the changes arising
5. Webster's Third International Unabridged Dictionary 611 (3d ed. 1981) (emphasis
supplied).
6. Panek v. Gulf Ins. Co., 341 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Leonard v.
Albany Mach. & Supply, 339 So. 2d 458 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), writ denied, 341 So.
2d 419 (1977); Leathern v. Moore, 265 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
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in risk and utility from incorporating plaintiff's alternative design into
the product. This comparison must also take into account the burden
on the manufacturer of adopting plaintiff's alternative design. Unlike
the threshold requirement, the risk/utility balancing test employed by
the new Act in its design liability provisions is an old and familiar
concept in Louisiana tort jurisprudence. Our Louisiana courts have long
recognized that the risk/utility test is suitable for determining the presence
of ordinary negligence. 7 More recently, with the development of strict
liability under Louisiana Civil Code article 2317, and its requirement
that the thing in defendant's custody poses an "unreasonable risk of
harm," the balancing test has come into common use.' The risk/utility
balancing test also has been used in cases involving ultra-hazardous
activities under the doctrine established in Langlois v. Allied Chemical
Corp. 9
For a brief period, a risk/utility balancing test was even used in
product liability cases by Louisiana courts to define an "unreasonably
dangerous" characteristic of a product. 10 From the Louisiana jurispru-
7. Turner v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 252 La. 810, 214 So. 2d 153 (1968); Vital
v. Housing Authority of New Iberia, 360 So. 2d 1182 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978); Miller
v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 189 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 249 La. 750, 190 So. 2d 912 (1966); Goff v. Carlino, 181 So. 2d 426 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1965), writ denied, 248 La. 1033, 183 So. 2d 653 (1966).
.8. Dobbs v. Gulf Oil Co., 759 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1985); Brown v. Sears, Roebuck
and Co., 514 So. 2d 439 (La. 1987); Lany v. State, 495 So. 2d 1284 (La. 1986) (plaintiff
falls into hole along sea wall obscured by grass on lakefront area); Entrevia v. Hood,
427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983); Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980); Cormier
v. City of Breaux Bridge, 524 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988); Duncan v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 499 So. 2d 632 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986), writ denied, 503
So. 2d 21 (1987); Dean v. Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist., 496 So. 2d 1352 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1986) (port's fender system containing gaps; deckhand falls when foot catches
in gap of fender); May v. Lafayette Parish Police Jury, 487 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 489 So. 2d 1276 (1986); Lajaunie v. Metropolitan Property & Liab.
Ins. Co., 481 So. 2d 1357 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); Baker v. Sewerage & Water Bd.,
466 So. 2d 720 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985); Carter v. Board of Supervisors, 459 So. 2d
1263 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), writ denied, 462 So. 2d 1248 (1985); Thompson v. Ewin,
457 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 460 So. 2d 1043 (1984) (11-year old
child drowns in pool located in isolated rural area); Bizette v. State Farm Ins. Co., 454
So. 2d 197 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 459 So. 2d 539 (1984); Wilson v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 448 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); McGee v. McClure, 442 So. 2d
625 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), writ denied, 444 So. 2d 1225 (1984) (2-year old drowns in
fenced pond in rural, fairly unpopulated area through a gate that was generally closed,
but not closed at the time of the accident); Verrett v. Cameron Tel. Co., 417 So. 2d
1319 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 422 So. 2d 164 (1982); Goodlow v. City of Alexandria,
407 So. 2d 1305 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
9. 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1957).
10. Commencing in 1971 with the Louisiana Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971),
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dence mentioned above, there are derived various important principles
concerning the nature and functioning of the balancing test. A major
principle has been adopted by our courts from the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 293, comment b, which involves the relationship between the
two sides of a balancing test. In this respect, the Louisiana jurisprudence
establishes that as the risk increases, either by the increased chance of
injury or by increased severity of the harm, the amount of utility required
to justify the risk increases proportionately."
The balancing test is described in the new Act by a single sentence,2
in Section .56, which provides:
The likelihood that the product's design would cause the clai-
mant's damage, and the gravity of that harm, outweighed the
burden on the manufacturer of adopting such alternative design
and the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative design on the
utility of the product.
the Louisiana courts shifted from the negligence standard in products cases to what the
supreme court in Weber billed as "strict liability," with the Weber test being that a
product was defective if it was found to be "unreasonably dangerous to normal use."
In Weber, the supreme court provided no definition or test for determining when the
product was "unreasonably dangerous" and this was simply left to the determination of
the trier of fact.
Subsequently, some courts of appeal in Louisiana, on their own, commenced occasional
use of the risk/utility test to determine "unreasonably dangerous" in products liability
cases. The first such case appears to be Guilyot v. Del-Gulf Supply, Inc., 362 So. 2d
816 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 365 So. 2d 243 (1978).
The Louisiana Supreme Court briefly used the risk/utility test in products cases com-
mencing with Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980), but the very next
year the court switched to a "consumer expectancy" test to determine "unreasonably
dangerous" in products cases, the same test that is provided in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A (1986). DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26 (La.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 836, 103 S. Ct. 82 (1982). See also Hebert v. Brazzel, 403
So. 2d 1242 (La. 1981). Except for a few lower court decisions, the risk/utility balancing
test was ignored in Louisiana product liability cases until the supreme court's reshaping
of the product liability law in Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110
(La. 1986).
Along the way, some courts were uncertain in their choice to use the risk/utility balancing
test. Thus, in Strickland v. Fowler, 499 So. 2d 199 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 500
So. 2d 411 (1986), the second circuit applied both the risk/utility and the consumer
expectancy test for design liability. In Pawlak v. Brown, 430 So. 2d 1346 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 439 So. 2d 1072 (1983), the third circuit essentially merged both tests
and applied the risk/utility test as means of determining consumer expectancy.
II. Goff v. Carlino, 181 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965), writ denied, 248 La.
1033, 183 So. 2d 653 (1966); Miller v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., 189 So.
2d 463 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 249 La. 750, 190 So. 2d 912 (1966). See also
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 293 comment (b) (1965).
12. The sentence which follows simply addresses the "likelihood" of the damage
element of the balancing test and requires that adequate warnings about the product be
taken into account in determining such likelihood.
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The sentence structure makes clear that the "risk" side of the balancing
test encompasses the traditional elements of likelihood of damage and
the gravity of such harm, and that the weight of these elements comprises
this side of the balancing test. Conspicuous by its absence in this
description of the "risk side" of the balancing test is mention of the
plaintiff's alternative design. In contrast, the plaintiff's alternative design
and the results flowing therefrom are principal factors of both elements
comprising the utility side of the balancing test.
The above description makes clear that the object of the balancing
test is to determine whether. the risk "outweighed" the utility. There
are no qualifying terms applied to "outweighed" and it appears clear
that determining the existence of any outweighing at all-however slight-
is the sole objective of the test. In neither the balancing test nor elsewhere
in the new Act is there any requirement for a margin of safety. Rather,
the Act speaks only in terms of a product characteristic being "unrea-
sonably dangerous," with the test for "unreasonably dangerous" in
design measured only by whether the product's risk outweighed to any
extent at all, the product's utility. Thus, only if the "utility side" is
outweighed by the "risk side," however slightly, does the plaintiff
establish this requirement for design liability.
Likewise, the statutory wording of the balancing test indicates that
the function of the balancing test is not solely to consider the risks and
utility arising from the alternative design. The balancing test contemplates
comparison of two designs; one is the "alternative design" incorporated
into the utility analysis, and the other is the "product's design" referred
to on the "risk side." The phrase "the product's design" refers to the
product as designed at the time of the accident."
Some questions concerning the interpretation of the elements of each
side of the balancing test include:
(1) What side of the test takes into account the measure of
utility arising from the product's design at the time of the
accident, as distinguished from the adverse effect on "such
utility" arising from the alternative design?
(2) What side of the test takes into account the increase or
decrease of risk arising from incorporation of the alternative
design into the product? Such changes in design are necessarily
13. Thus, in La. R.S. 9:2800.59 (Supp. 1989), which provides the manufacturer with
three affirmative defenses, the opening paragraph refers to the liability "for damage
proximately caused by a characteristic of the product's design," which clearly refers to
the product as it existed at the time of the accident. Likewise, in the description of the
balancing test itself, in La. R.S. 9:2800.56 (Supp. 1989), the phrase "the product's design"
relates to the causing of claimant's damage, thereby also indicating reference to the
product as it was designed at the time of the accident.
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components of the test, and the threshold requirement mandates
that the alternative design have a risk decreasing capability at
least sufficient to avoid the damage that, in fact, occurred to
plaintiff in the accident.
It reasonably appears that the measure of utility of the product's
design at the time of the accident is accounted for on the utility side
of the test. The statutory wording of the balancing test clearly refers
to the utility of the product as the product was designed at the time
of the accident.
The increase or decrease of risk arising from incorporation of the
alternative design into the product should also be taken into account
on the utility side of the test. The ultimate question posed by the Act
regarding design liability is whether the product as designed at the time
of the accident posed risks and possessed utilities judged, by means of
the balancing test, as "unreasonably dangerous." The legitimate function
of the effects flowing from the alternative design reasonably can apply
only to the opposite side of the scale. Additionally, the "risk side" of
the balancing test description in the Act refers only to the product as
originally designed, whereas all references to the effect of the "alternative
design" are relegated to the "utility side." New risks or decreased risks
flowing from the alternative design clearly affect the usefulness of the
product, and hence, legitimately affect the "utility side" of the balancing
test.
COMPOSITION OF THE RISK SIDE
As summarized above, the risk side of the balancing test encompasses
the following elements:
(1) the likelihood the product's design at the time of the accident
would cause claimant's damage, and
(2) the gravity of that damage.
The statutory wording of the balancing test makes clear that the function
of the risk side is to accumulate all danger factors associated with the
product's use as originally designed and existing at the time of plaintiff's
accident, taking into account all reasonably anticipated alterations and
modifications to the product. However, the risk side has the following
additional characteristics:
(1) The focus of the likelihood of harm under the new Act is
the likelihood that the product as designed at the time of the
accident will cause plaintiff's particular accident and damage.
The same is true of the gravity or seriousness of that harm.
(2) In measuring the likelihood of harm, the statute requires
that warnings provided with the product must be taken into
account, so long as those warnings are "adequate" in nature
1990]
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and the manufacturer has taken reasonable steps to provide
those warnings to users or handlers of the product. This re-
quirement is in accord with the previous Louisiana jurisprudence
that recognizes that the instructions and warnings given with
respect to the operating capabilities and limitations of a product
are a significant part of the overall design.' 4
The plain statutory language of the new Products Liability Act now
makes clear that, along with the physical design of the product, warnings
meeting the Act's definition of "adequate warnings," which the man-
ufacturer has taken reasonable steps to provide users and handlers of
the product, are a legitimate tool to minimize dangers arising from a
product's use so that it will not be "unreasonably dangerous."' 5
As discussed above, while risks arising from the product as originally
designed are taken into account in the "risk side" of the balancing test,
the same is not true of risks arising from the effect of the alternative
design, which are accounted for solely on the utility side. It seems
appropriate, therefore, to make observations concerning whether the
alternative design identified by plaintiff simply makes the product safer
only in the sense of avoiding plaintiff's particular injury. There is a
temptation to think in simplistic terms by focusing on how an alternative
design can prevent plaintiff's harm, without considering other dangers
that may arise from similar or other uses of the product. The reality
of product design is that while a particular alternative design advanced
by the plaintiff may prevent plaintiff's particular accident and damage
in the case at bar, the alternative design may also create other dangers
under different circumstances resulting in a net danger gain to the
product as alternatively designed. 6
14. Reed v. John Deere, 569 F. Supp. 371 (M.D. La. 1983); Dalton v. Tulane Toyota,
526 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. La. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 703 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983);
LeBoeuf v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 451 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. La. 1978); Tenneco
Oil Co. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 495 So. 2d 1317 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
497 So. 2d 1015 (1986).
Note: The use of warnings is also a legitimate tool for use by custodians of otherwise
unreasonably dangerous things in Article 2317 cases. See LaJaunie v. Metropolitan Property
Liab. Ins. Co., 481 So. 2d 1357 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985).
15. In the past, some courts have either ignored or have been unaware of these
principles, thereby rejecting the legitimacy of warnings for use by a manufacturer as a
tool, along with a product's intrinsic design, to minimize dangers from a product's use.
Also, these courts have erroneously stated that a manufacturer has a duty to "design
out" a hazard if it is feasible to do so, and can only resort to warnings if the hazard
cannot be designed out. Perkins v. Emerson Elec. Co., 482 F. Supp. 1347 (W.D. La.
1980); Thomas v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 502 So. 2d 157 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
16. Schneider v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 496 So. 2d 1258 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986),
where the claimed design defect in a riding lawn mower was the failure to have a "shut
off" or "deadman's switch" under the seat, which would automatically shut off the
[Vol. 50
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COMPOSITION OF THE UTILITY SIDE
As summarized above, the utility side of the balancing test encom-
passes the following elements:
(1) the utility of the product as designed at the time of the
accident.
(2) the adverse effect, if any, on utility caused by the alternative
design arising not only from changes in usefulness, but also
from lessened or added dangers arising from the alternative
design.
(3) the burden on the manufacturer of adopting such an alter-
native design.
The utility side of the balancing test seeks to accumulate all the usefulness
and societal benefits associated with the product generally-not just with
respect to the product's role in injury to plaintiff in the case at bar.
The Act's restrictive wording used to describe the risk side of the
balancing test is not used to describe the utility side of the balancing
test. The utility side also includes factors related to the defendant man-
ufacturer's undertaking to design the product differently so as to in-
corporate plaintiff's alternative design. This is generally referred to as
the "burden on the manufacturer." Unlike negligence and Louisiana
Civil Code article 2317 cases, the new Louisiana Act requires evaluation
of both the product's utility in its original design at the time of plaintiff's
accident and this utility as hypothetically affected by the product's
incorporation of the alternative design. The safety enhancement embodied
in plaintiff's alternative design, which has the capability of preventing
plaintiff's harm in his particular accident, is only one of numerous
engine when the driver got off the mower. It was alleged that this device would have
prevented the plaintiff's injury, which was caused when the mover moved after the plaintiff
got off the mower, leaving it running. The evidence showed, however, that while the
alternative design would eliminate certain hazards, it created additional dangers to the
safe operation of the mower in other situations. One such situation was that the rider
was often jostled in the seat when the mower was used on uneven terrain, causing the
motor to stop briefly. When the driver came back down on the seat the motor would
restart with a surge because of the accumulation of unburned fuel. This surge caused the
mower to be unstable and subject to overturning and throwing the rider from the machine.
The court found the mower not defective in design.
For other cases illustrating the risk side of the balancing test, along with the types of
evidence useful to prove the risk side (as for example, the past accident history of similar
products), see Zumo v. R.T. Vanderbilt Co., 527 So. 2d 1074 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988)
(discussing affidavit sufficiency in a Motion for Summary Judgment on the danger pre-
sented by a product); Crochet v. Pritchard, 509 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987)
(Article 2317 case); Jurovich v. Catalanotto, 506 So. 2d 662 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ
denied, 508 So. 2d 87 (1987); Bloxom v. Bloxom, 494 So. 2d 1297 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1986), rev'd on other grounds, 512 So. 2d 839 (1987); Aguillard v. Langlois, 471 So. 2d
1011 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 476 So. 2d 356 (1985) (Article 2317 case).
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factors taken into account to determine the overall effect of the alter-
native design on the utility of the product. In some situations, the safety
enhancement feature of the alternative design may not only create other
dangers for other uses, but may also impair the usefulness of the product
in other uses. In some circumstances, an alternative design may even
produce an overall net decrease in the utility of a product.17
The Louisiana jurisprudence recognizes the following factors as el-
ements to be considered in the utility side of the balancing test:
(1) The functional usefulness of the product should be consid-
ered, not only in the narrow circumstance of use in the case
being tried, but aiso including its usefulness to the public gen-
erally. 11
Within the scope of functional usefulness of the product are
not only the variety of uses to which the product may be put,
but also considerations relating to benefits derived from such
uses, 19 such as:
- attaining personal convenience, recreation, or aesthetic
satisfaction.
- the efficiency, accuracy, uniformity, and overall effect-
iveness with which the product performs.
(2) A second major category is "social utility," which our
Louisiana jurisprudence describes as "moral, social, and eco-
17. See Clark v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 254 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971),
where the plaintiff either fell off or jumped off her riding lawn mower while it was in
motion, which subsequently ran over and injured her foot. The plaintiff claimed that the
mower was defective because it was not equipped with a "dead-man's switch" designed
into the mower's clutch, a device that required that the clutch be depressed to prevent
the mower from automatically shutting itself off.
The defendant's evidence proved, however, that this type of deadman's switch would
create more dangers than it avoided. The defendant's engineer testified that the manu-
facturer's study of such devices on prototypes and consumer tests showed that the user
would tire of keeping constant pressure on the clutch and would wire the clutch down,
thus negating its function.
18. Duncan v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 499 So. 2d 632 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1986), writ denied, 503 So. 2d 21 (1987); Baker v. Sewerage & Water Board, 466
So. 2d 720 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985); Guilyot v. Del-Gulf Supply, Inc., 362 So. 2d 816
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 365 So. 2d 243 (1978); Goff v. Carlino, 181 So. 2d
426 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965), writ denied, 248 La. 1033, 183 So. 2d 653 (1966).
19. Landry v. State, 495 So. 2d 1284 (La. 1986); Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So.
2d 585 (La. 1980); May v. Lafayette Parish Police Jury, 487 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 489 So. 2d 1276 (1986); Thompson v. Ewins, 457 So. 2d 303 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 460 So. 2d 1043 (1984); McGee v. McClure, 442 So. 2d 625
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), writ denied, 444 So. 2d 1225 (1984).
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nomic conditions." Entrevia v. Hood2 ° described these "social
utility" factors as questions the judge or jury is called upon to
decide "in the same way that the legislature finds the standards
or patterns of utility and morals in the life of the community."
(3) The "economic conditions" embodied in the "social utility"
concept embraces a variety of factors including:
- the financial cost to the manufacturer and to the public
in terms of lowered or increased cost of incorporating the
alternative design into the product.
- the effect of economic factors in the marketplace, etc.
Under the new Products Liability Act, such economic conditions
are described by the phrase "the burden on the manufacturer
of adopting such alternative design." '2'
"Economic conditions" means economics of the marketplace
in which the product is sold and in which it competes. Thus,
the effect of economic conditions on the price at which the
product must be sold to be competitive in the marketplace is a
legitimate part of the "Burden on the Manufacturer" analysis,
but financial considerations peculiar to one particular manufac-
turer would not be a legitimate factor.
The wording of the balancing test in the new Act takes into account
two effects of the alternative design, and both affect the weight given
to the utility side. They are: (i) the adverse effect, if any, the alternative
design has on the utility of the product, and (ii) the "burden on the
manufacturer" of adopting the alternative design. The new Act calls
for the risk side to remain constant, and that none of the effects of
the alternative design affect the risk side. Rather, all effects of the
alternative design add or reduce the weight given to the utility side. As
previously noted, the factor "burden on the manufacturer of adopting
such alternative design" figures into the utility side of the balancing
test. Also noted are the financial considerations: the selling price of the
product using the alternative design and its competitiveness in the mar-
ketplace are solid components of the "burden on the manufacturer."
It must also be noted, however, that the degree of functional usefulness
of a product and the degree of danger or safety of a product arising
from the alternative design can affect the weight not only of the product's
utility, but also can affect the burden on the manufacturer, depending
20. 427 So. 2d 1146, 1149-51 (La. 1983). See also Thompson v. Tuggle, 486 So. 2d
144 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 489 So. 2d 919 (1986); Bizette v. State Farm Ins.
Co., 454 So. 2d 197 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 459 So. 2d 539 (1984).
21. La. R.S. 9:2800.56(2) (Supp. 1989).
19901
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
upon the magnitude and resulting economic importance of the usefulness
or safety factors. Thus, to the extent an alternative design increases or
decreases the usefulness of a product as originally designed, there results
a corresponding effect on the utility of the product. However, it must
also be noted that if the alternative design should significantly increase
or decrease usefulness, the competitiveness of the product can be affected
in that it will be easier or harder to sell depending on the demand for
the product even to the extent of providing the product an overall
competitive advantage or disadvantage. In this way, the change in use-
fulness may also affect the burden on the manufacturer element of the
utility side. The same results can flow from significant increase or
decrease in dangers arising from incorporating the alternative design.
To the extent that the alternative design decreases danger, the resulting
product becomes more useful; however, any resulting increase in danger
makes the product less useful because such dangers must be avoided by
restricted use of the product. A large increase or decrease in the mag-
nitude of danger can affect demand for the product and its overall
competitive position in the marketplace, and hence, can affect the burden
on the manufacturer.
The Relationship of the Alternative Design Evidence to the Balancing
Test
The threshold requirement dictates that the alternative design increase
the product's safety to the extent that it is "capable" of preventing
plaintiff's damage in the case at bar. As previously noted, however, an
alternative design may well do more than provide a particular measure
of increased safety. Indeed, the alternative design may also:
- produce increased safety for other uses or circumstances of
use of the product as well,
- produce new dangers not only to plaintiff in his particular
use of the product at the time of the accident, but also to other
persons who are making the same use of the product under
different circumstances, or are making different uses of the
product, and
- at the same time, such alternative design may actually decrease
the utility of the product.
These principles are well illustrated in Guilyot v. Del-Gulf Supply,
Inc. 22 In Guilyot, the defendant manufactured a pipe hook for use on
the end of crane cables to move heavy lengths of pipe from one place
to another. The defendant designed the pipe hooks to fit into each end
22. 362 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 365 So. 2d 243 (1978).
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of a pipe, so that after a length of pipe was lowered into place and
slack came into the cable, the pipe hooks automatically released. The
plaintiff was injured at the loading site when a 40 foot length of 36
inch diameter pipe rolled into him as it was laid on a barge. The pipe
hooks did not break or slip out while carrying pipe, or otherwise perform
contrary to their design. Because of the automatic release feature, the
hooks did not hold the pipe after it was lowered.
The plaintiff claimed that the pipe hooks were defectively designed
because they had neither a clamp nor a long extension into the pipe to
prevent the hook's dislodgement upon release of the pressure from the
weight of the pipe. By showing that such devices are used on two other
kinds of pipe hooks, the plaintiff showed not only the feasibility of
such designs, but also that such alternative designs actually existed on
other products and could have been used to avoid the accident.
The court, on its own, applied a risk/utility test to measure whether
the pipe hook design was unreasonably dangerous. The court noted that
the plaintiff's alternative design would indeed have prevented plaintiff's
injury. The court then proceeded to find, however, that the automatic
pipe release feature with which the pipe hook was originally designed
offered the important utility of ease of removal. The release feature
also served the legitimate purpose of avoiding risks of injury frequently
occurring to workers climbing the pipe in order to release the retaining
device as required by plaintiff's alternative design. The original design
avoided this new danger as well as providing the "ease of removal"
utility. The court held that the risks permitted by the pipe hook as
originally designed were not proven to be unreasonably disproportionate
to the risks avoided by the alternative design-hence, the pipe hooks
were not unreasonably dangerous in design. The alternative design pro-
posed by plaintiff not only decreased the danger of the use of the pipe
hook in his own accident, it increased the danger in other situations of
use, thus also adversely impacting the utility of the pipe hook.
Guilyot illustrates well how an alternative design can decrease the
danger for one use or situation, but can increase the danger in other
uses or situations, and at the same time have an adverse impact on the
utility of the product.
Most factors contributing to or affecting these risks and utilities are
legitimately to be considered, in the make-up of the balancing test.
However, any factors that are inconsistent with the concept embodied
in the threshold requirement-which contemplates comparing the actual
product involved in the injury only to an "alternative design" of that
same product-are not part of the balancing test. Thus, the new Act
does not appear to allow a comparison of the existing product with an
alternative product, i.e., a "substitute product."
The availability of an "alternative product" is not a factor in the
balancing test under the new Act because:
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(1) Section .54(B) specifies that a product is unreasonably dan-
gerous in design "if and only if" it qualifies as such under
Section .56;
(2) Nowhere does the Act make reference to "alternative product;"
and
(3) Taking into account in the balancing test the availability of
an "alternative product" is contrary to the expressed intent of
Section .56 that the balancing test compares the original product
that caused plaintiff's injury with an alternative design of such
original product. That an "alternative design" and "alternative
product" are mutually exclusive concepts is made clear in Hal-
phen, which provides "alternative product" as a "second rea-
son" for design liability, and "alternative design" as a separately
identified "third reason" for design liability.
Similarly, because the threshold requirement of the test for design
liability requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of an alternative
design for the product that is capable of preventing plaintiff's danger,
under the new Act, a court or jury cannot find a product unreasonably
dangerous if no alternative design was available at all-either at the
time of manufacture, or for that matter, at the time of trial. An example
of such a product is the small "Saturday night special" pistol.23
Clearly, one of the effects of the new Act is to abolish the unrea-
sonably dangerous per se theory of Halphen24 as grounds for design
liability and as a free standing theory of manufacturer's liability. One
of the public policy reasons underlying this change probably is, as
recently indicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in Perkins v. F.LE. Corp. ,25 that such a determination is more
a policy matter for the legislature, than a matter for juries. 26 Federal
legislation reflecting public policy decisions provides that certain types
of products are so dangerous that they should not be sold at all. 27
Inherent in the twin requirements of the new Act is the principle
that for design liability to exist, there must be something different that
can be done with the design to make it safer. This, in turn, raises the
23. Cf. Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1985).
24. Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 494 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
25. Id. In Perkins, the court wondered whether a product could be so dangerous
that it ought not to be sold at all; perhaps that is a determination not for a court, but
for a legislature.
26. 762 F.2d at 1265-66, n.44, 1275, n.68 (emphasis added).
27. See, e.g., the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1261-1276 (1982
& Supp. 1989); the Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1191-1204 (1982 & Supp.
1989); the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2051-2083 (1982 & Supp. 1989);
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1381-1431 (1982 &
Supp. 1989).
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fundamental question of whether, under the new Act, a product must
always be made in the safest possible manner. Put another way, does
the new Act require the manufacturer to provide increased safety features
for a product whose utility already outweighs the risks it presents? The
issue is an important one and poses the question of whether the new
Act contemplates that if the utility of a product does outweigh its risks,
the product can in effect be "safe enough," even though an alternative
design identified by plaintiff would have the net effect of making the
product safer without impairing the product's utility. The new Act gives
important guidance for this determination. Section .54(B) provides: "A
product is unreasonably dangerous if and only if...."
In the design section, Section .56, the only provision addressing the
measure of safety required of a product is the single sentence describing
the risk/utility balancing test. As previously indicated, the Act expresses
no notion of a required margin of safety. Rather, the Act speaks only
in terms of a product being "unreasonably dangerous;" as applied to
design liability, the test for unreasonably dangerous is measured only
by whether the product's risks outweighs to any extent at all, by however
thin a margin, the product's utility. The sole determinants of the measure
of "unreasonably dangerous" in design, therefore, address only whether
the product's risks outweigh to any extent the product's utility. The
reasonable interpretation of the legislative intent appears, therefore, to
be that so long as the utility of a product outweighs its risks, a man-
ufacturer may lawfully adopt a design that incorporates less than all
available safety features, or may incorporate safety features that are less
effective than others that may be available. There is solid authority for
this interpretation, not only from the wording of the new Act itself,
discussed above, but also because the balancing test under the new Act
is taken verbatim from the 1983 proposed Louisiana Products Act pre-
pared by the Louisiana State Law Institute. The official comments of
the Law Institute concerning the design liability section of that proposed
Act made clear that the intent was as follows:
The availability of a variety of products with differing levels of
quality and safety and corresponding differences in price is
desirable, so long as the resulting products are not unreasonably
dangerous .28
It appears, therefore, that by adopting the new Louisiana Products
Liability Act, the legislature has now legislatively overruled cases such
as Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. 29 and Toups v. Sears. 30
28. La. H.R. 711, Reg. Sess., § 2800.5, comment (c) (1983).
29. 484 So. 2d at 110.
30. 507 So. 2d 809 (La. 1987). Additionally, the new Act would overrule such cases
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Application of the Balancing Test by the Trier of Fact
Potentially, the factors going into the makeup of both sides of the
balancing test can be considered individually or in related groups. Ap-
plying these factors in related groups makes the factors more manageable
for the trier of fact and permits the balancing test to be divided into
three steps.
Step 1:
Quantifying the risk and the utility of the product as the product
was originally designed and existed at the time of claimant's
accident.
(a) The weight to be assigned to the risk side, involves
quantifying both the likelihood that the product would
cause claimant's damage on the occasion of plaintiff's ac-
cident and the gravity of that injury.
(b) The weight to be assigned to the utility side, involves
an assessment of the weight that is found to stem from
the overall utility of the product for general uses that are
within the scope of "reasonably anticipated use" of the
product as originally designed.
Step 2:
Quantifying the effects of the alternative design, all of which
are taken into account on the utility side. With respect to the
effect of the alternative design, taking into account all uses and
circumstances of use of the product that are within the scope
of "reasonably anticipated use":
(a) The reduced danger resulting from incorporation of the
alternative design is compared with any increased danger
also resulting therefrom; and, a quantification of weight
for the utility side is then made of the net danger reduction
or increase arising from the use of the alternative design.31
(b) Likewise, any utility reduction arising from the alter-
native design is compared with any utility gained also re-
sulting therefrom; and, a quantification of weight is then
as Thompson v. Tuggle, 486 So. 2d 144 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 489 So. 2d
919 (1986), where the third circuit held it was not enough for a safety feature to be
available as an option rather than incorporated into the basic product at its manufacture.
31. As indicated, the effects of the alternaive design on risk and on utility of the
product are both accounted for on the utility side of the balancing test. The quantification
of weight for the net danger reduction produces added weight to the utility side from
the corresponding increase in the product's utility. The opposite effect occurs with respect
to a net danger increase.
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made of the net utility reduction or increase arising from
use of the alternative design.
(c) A quantification of weight is assigned to the burden
on the manufacturer of adopting the alternative design.
(d) The weight quantifications in Step 2 are then compared
and combined to determine, in effect, whether modifying
the original design according to the alternative design results
in a net benefit or net detriment in utility of the product.
This resulting weight quantification is the net effect of the
alternative design.32
Ascertaining the net benefit or net detriment flowing from the alter-
native design is one of the natural points of focus of the overall balancing
process, and at trial, will ordinarily be the focus of argument by both
plaintiff and defendant. Of course, if incorporation of an alternative
design ultimately produces a net detriment, it is immediately recognized
that plaintiff's alternative design cannot meet the ultimate requirement
of the balancing test for manufacturer's design liability.
Step 3:
Balancing the "risk side" against the "utility side."
(a) The weight of the net benefit or net detriment from
Step 2's analysis of the effects of the alternative design is
now combined with the weight earlier assigned in Step 1
(b) to the utility of the product as originally designed.
- The net benefit of an alternative design serves as
a deduction from the original utility weight.
- The net detriment of an alternative design serves as
an addition to the original utility weight.
In this manner, the "utility side" of the balancing test is adjusted in
its weight upward or downward, as required, and the "utility side" is
now ready for final weighing in the balance with the "risk side."
(b) The weight of the "utility side" as adjusted is now
compared with the weight of the risk side made in Step
1, which has remained constant throughout the balancing
process.
- As the statute requires, if the weight of the risk
side now outweighs the utility side, by however slight
a margin, the balancing test requirement for design
32. It may be observed, on the other hand, that the same results could be obtained
by simply assessing weights to all these factors individually, and then carrying them over
collectively to Step 3.
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liability is met.
- Otherwise, the requirement is not met.
Explaining the balancing test in a jury charge is challenging. The
appendix to this article contains a recommended charge for the jury in
a product liability design case. The suggested jury charge does not include
the defenses available to the manufacturer under Section .59 of the Act,
which operate to relieve the manufacturer of liability even though plain-
tiff produces evidence to show that the product was unreasonably dan-
gerous in design.
Affirmative Defenses of the Manufacturer Under Section .59
Even where plaintiff bears his burden of proving that the product
was unreasonably dangerous in design, the manufacturer may avoid
liability by proving any one of three affirmative defenses under Section
.59. These three defenses are:
(1) Defense relating to the danger that causes claimant's damage,
upon proof by the manufacturer:
- that at the time the product left the manufacturer's
control, either the existence of such danger, or the design
characteristic that caused the damage, was not known to
defendant manufacturer, and was not knowable from then
existing, reasonably available scientific and technological
knowledge.
(2) Defense relating to claimant's identified alternative design,
upon proof by the manufacturer:
- that at the time the product left the manufacturer's
control, the existence of claimant's alternative design was
not known to defendant manufacturer and was not know-
able from then existing, reasonably available scientific and
technological knowledge.
(3) The "Feasibility Defense," upon proof by the manufacturer:
- that at the time the product left the manufacturer's
control, claimant's identified alternative design was not
feasible from then existing, reasonably available scientific
and technological knowledge or economic practicality.
Under the doctrine of Webster v. Rushing,33 inasmuch as the elements
of these three defenses raise new issues and appear not to be part of
33. 316 So. 2d 111 (La. 1975).
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claimant's burden of proof, all three appear to be affirmative defenses,
which the defendant must prove under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 1005. All three of these affirmative defenses relate to knowledge
that the manufacturer, in fact, did not possess at the time the product
left its control. All three of these defenses make clear that the manu-
facturer is required to have only the level of knowledge and expertise
that was "reasonably available" from scientific and technological knowl-
edge existing at the time the product left the manufacturer's control.
The standard of knowledge and expertise required of a manufacturer
with respect to its design liability is a negligence standard. The essential
difference in the three defenses relates to the subject matter of the
knowledge.
- The first affirmative defense relates to knowledge of the par-
ticular' type of danger that caused plaintiff's harm, such as
knowing that exposure to asbestos causes cancer, and applies
not only to knowledge that the product is the' source of such
danger, but also to knowledge of the design characteristic that
causes the danger-for example, knowledge that smoke from
cigarettes causes cancer.
- The second affirmative defense affords a defense to design
liability if the manufacturer proves that at the time the product
left its control, the existence of claimant's alternative design was
not known or knowable from then existing reasonably available
scientific and technological knowledge.
- The third affirmative defense is a type of "feasibility defense"
that also relates to plaintiff's identified alternative design. It
affords a defense to design liability if the manufacturer proves
that:
(1) the alternative design was not practical from an eco-
nomic standpoint, that is, from the standpoint of financial
feasibility, or
(2) that the alternative design was not feasible from rea-
sonably available scientific and technological knowledge
existing at the time the product left the manufacturer's
control.
In practice, the overall defense approach of the manufacturer is not
simply to focus on available affirmative defenses. Rather, the defensive
posture of the manufacturer frequently is to prevent the plaintiff from
establishing elements that the plaintiff must prove to establish that the
product was unreasonably dangerous in its design. Specifically, the man-
ufacturer may focus his attack on causation issues, such as the manner
of occurrence of the accident or the point in time or manner in which
the injury occurred. Changes in the product occurring since the product
left the manufacturer's control also provide a defense focus for the
1990]
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manufacturer, as for example, where the product contains substituted
components that were not made by defendant,34 or the product has been
subjected to alterations or modifications that are not reasonably antic-
ipated," or improper replacement parts are incorporated in the product.16
The manufacturer may also attack the use of the product at the time
of the accident as being not within "reasonably anticipated use," as
for example, where a glass bottle is used as a hammer.
Overall, in view of the character of the manufacturer's foregoing
affirmative defenses, the manufacturer's design duty under the new
Louisiana Products Liability Act appears, in practical effect, to be a
negligence standard. In measuring the manufdcturer's design liability,
the focus of the new Act is on the manufacturer's conduct and knowledge
equally as much as the focus is on the product itself.
34. Thornhill v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 394 So. 2d 1189 (La. 1981).
35. Frey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 271 So. 2d 56 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 273
So. 2d 840 (1973).
36. St. Pierre v. Gabel, 351 So. 2d 821 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
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APPENDIX
Recommended Jury Instruction
"Unreasonably Dangerous in Design"
For a product to be "unreasonably dangerous in design," the plain-
tiff must prove that at the time the product left the manufacturer's
control:
(1st) there existed an alternative design for the product that was
capable of preventing plaintiff's damage, and
(2nd) the likelihood that the product would cause plaintiff's
damage, and the gravity of that damage, outweighs:
(a) the burden on the manufacturer of adopting such al-
ternative design, and
(b) the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative design
on the utility of the product.
In connection with this balancing test, which this second requirement
calls upon you to make, I further instruct you as follows:
- In determining the likelihood that the product would cause
plaintiff's damage, you must consider not only the physical
design of the product, but also you must take into account
adequate warnings that the manufacturer has taken reasonable
steps to provide to users and handlers of the product.
- In determining the burden on the manufacturer of adopting
such alternative design, you must consider the economic cost to
the manufacturer to incorporate the alternative design into the
product, as well as practical realities of the marketplace, such
as, for example, the ability of the manufacturer to price the
product so that it is competitive, and the effect on demand for
the product arising from any changes in the utility of the prod-
uct. Such economic costs exclude financial considerations pe-
culiar to one particular manufacturer.
- The utility of the product as used in the balancing test includes
the product's functional usefulness, as well as any moral, social,
and economic benefits provided by the product. These include,
for example:
- benefits derived from the product's use in terms of its
providing personal convenience, recreation, or aesthetic sat-
isfaction, as well as providing benefits of a commercial,
industrial, health, or other nature, and
- benefits in terms of the overall effectiveness with which
the product performs, including such matters as the prod-
uct's efficiency, accuracy, and uniformity.
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In determining the effect of the alternative design on the utility of
the product, you must determine not only the utility of the product as
it was designed and existed at the time of the accident, but you must
also consider changes in the product's utility arising from incorporating
the alternative design into the product, such as:
- increase or decrease in the usefulness of the product because
the alternative design makes the product safer to use or more
dangerous to use by users generally.
- increase or decrease in the functional use to which the product
may be put by users generally.
- increase or decrease in the moral, social, and economic benefits
derived from the product by users generally.
- the effects of the alternative design to make the product safer
or more dangerous to users generally, or to increase or decrease
the product's usefulness to users generally from a functional,
moral, social, or economic standpoint may also be effects of
such importance and magnitude so as to increase or decrease
the burden on the manufacturer of adopting the alternative
design. For example, changes in the safety or danger of the
product, or in the functional usefulness of the product may be
sufficiently important to affect the market demand for the prod-
uct, or to affect the competitive position of the product in the
marketplace.
In making the balancing test, you must keep in mind that you are
being called upon to apply the balancing test to the product as it would
be changed in its design by incorporating into it the alternative design
identified by plaintiff, and not to evaluate only the effects of the
alternative design alone.
Thus, in applying the balancing test you should assess and give
weight on the one side to the utility of the product as it was designed
by defendant and as it existed at the time of the accident, taking into
account any reasonably anticipated changes and modifications in the
product. You should then adjust this utility weight by taking into account
the effect of the plaintiff's alternative design. To this net utility weight,
you must add the weight that you assign to the burden of the manu-
facturer of adopting the alternative design. These combined weights
together comprise one side of the balancing test.
Next, you must determine the weight to be assessed to the other
side of the balancing test, which is the "risk side" and is the likelihood
the product would cause plaintiff's damage, and the gravity of that
damage. Having assigned this weight to the risk side, you are now in
a position to compare the weight you have assigned to the risk side,
with the weight you earlier assigned to the utility and burden of the
manufacturer side of the test.
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In comparing the weight of these two sides, I instruct you that if
the weight you assign to the risk side outweighs, to any extent at all,
the weight you assigned to the other side composed of the utility and
the burden on the manufacturer, then I instruct you to find the defen-
dant's product was unreasonably dangerous in its design if, and only
if, you also find that:
(1) the alternative design identified by plaintiff was in existence
at the time the product left the manufacturer's control, and
(b) that such alternative design was capable of preventing plain-
tiff's damage.

